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Abstract
Official statistics tend to rely on a headcount approach to poverty measurement, distin-
guishing ‘the poor’ from the ‘non-poor’ on the basis of an anchored threshold. Invariably, this
does little to engage with the gradations of material hardship affecting those living, to varying
degrees, below the poverty line. In response, this paper interrogates an apparent flatlining in
UK poverty to establish the changing profile of poverty, as well as those most affected by it.
Drawing on the Family Resources survey, this paper reveals an increasing depth of poverty
in the UK since , with bifurcation observable in the living standards of different per-
centile groups below the poverty line. In addition, this paper demonstrates substantial
compositional changes in the socio-demographic profile of (deep) poverty. Since ,
the likelihood of falling into deep poverty has increased for women, children, larger fami-
lies, Black people and those in full-time work. Within the context of COVID-, I argue
there is a need to re-think how we currently conceptualise poverty by better attending to
internal heterogeneity within the broader analytical and methodological category of ‘the
poor’. Doing so raises pressing questions about the prevailing modes of poverty measure-
ment that tend to frame and delimit the social scientific analysis of poverty, as well as the
policies deemed appropriate in tackling it.
Keywords: poverty gap; depth of poverty; relative poverty; poverty profile; social
security; destitution
Introduction
Social enquiry into relative poverty is currently faced with an ostensive contra-
diction. Research suggests we are witnessing increased material hardship and
destitution amongst those most vulnerable to socio-economic and welfare state
restructuring in liberal welfare regimes such as the UK (Bassel and Emejulu,
). This is perhaps unsurprising given that such contexts have typically been
characterised by residual public social assistance, high commodification and
market-based poverty alleviation strategies. Whilst there is non-trivial diversity
in the varieties of liberalism at play, English-speaking democracies have con-
verged on increasingly restrictive social transfers that have undermined the liv-
ing standards of low-income citizens over the last decade (Deeming, ).
Despite this, official statistics tell a story of remarkable stability in relative
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poverty rates across the same contexts with only minor or temporary upticks for
particular groups in recent years (DWP, a).
How then can the acute financial hardships engendered through welfare
revisioning and late capitalist transformation be squared with a relative stasis
in rates of relative poverty? In great part, minor fluctuations or declining rates
of relative poverty are an artefact of methodological limitation. The relative
poverty line is a somewhat arbitrary one that counts all those falling below a
given threshold (usually % or % of median incomes), which reveals little
about the changing income dynamics, socio-demographics or concentrations
of poverty (Sen, ; Veit-Wilson, ). Equally, it runs the risk of obscuring
fluctuations in the substantive living standards of those falling below the poverty
threshold by anchoring this to (potentially stagnating) median incomes. Within
the context of COVID- and stagnant or falling median incomes, these ongo-
ing limitations are all the more acute. Despite these cautionary axioms, there is
still a tendency within academic and policy analysis to characterise this thresh-
old approach as a definition of poverty, rather than measuring a particular dis-
tribution of below-average incomes. Such slippage between conceptual
definition and methodological categorisation leads to an attenuated analysis
of poverty, reduced to technical thresholds and subject to limitations of both
methodology and data (Lister, ). If the methods we choose to measure pov-
erty come to determine how we understand what it is (and who counts as ‘poor’)
then researchers find themselves in a situation where the methodological tail is
wagging the conceptual dog. This matters because dominant measures of pov-
erty invariably guide how we come to appraise and understand ‘the problem’, as
well as the policies deemed appropriate or necessary in tackling it.
In this paper, it is not my intention to detract from the measurement of
relative poverty and its widespread utility in poverty analysis or policy evalua-
tion. Rather, I aim to explore heterogeneity within this category to establish
changes in the composition and depth of poverty witnessed since .
Doing so demonstrates the distinctive merits of different approaches to poverty
measurement and how these can be combined to gain a fuller picture of low-
income realities and trends. In many respects, a unitary theory of poverty is
problematic in light of its multi-dimensional nature and any approach to pov-
erty measurement should also reflect and respect this reality. There is a rich his-
tory of doing so that can be traced back to the first systematic surveys of poverty
in the UK. Charles Booth pioneered a poverty line approach but also deployed
statistical methods and ethnographic observations to identify degrees of priva-
tion, including its correlates and underlying determinants. Criticising the lack of
empirical and policy attention being given to the changing structure and deter-
minants of ‘extreme poverty’ within advanced capitalist economies, the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on ‘extreme poverty’ and human rights recently
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recommended such an undertaking during an official country visit to the UK
(Alston, : ).
In response, this paper seeks to refine our conceptual, methodological and
policy understanding of ‘the poor’ in terms of measurement and composition.
Three lines of enquiry highlight the importance of doing so, exposing gaps in
what we currently know about the profile and depth of poverty. First, research
into the ‘poverty gap’ – the average distance low-income households fall from
the poverty threshold – comes some way to track aggregate changes in the depth
of poverty, and evidence suggests that the poverty gap for families and children
has increased since  (Lee, ). That said, this measure relies on an overall
average anchored to the poverty threshold and is therefore unable to fully cap-
ture inequality ‘below the line’. Second, academic and policy analysis has exam-
ined the systematic over-representation of women, children, Black, Asian and
minority ethnic (BAME) groups and disabled people in poverty. However, less
attention has been given to how these social differences intersect with concen-
trations of poverty. This seems particularly important if we are to better under-
stand how ‘social difference’ is articulated in relation to the material social
locations of people across the entirety of the income distribution, not just on
either side of a given threshold. Third, recent efforts have been made to estimate
the extent of ‘destitution’ in particular regions by drawing on local surveys to
construct national estimates (Bramley et al., ). The findings of these studies
suggest there are hidden degrees of hardship that are not being captured through
conventional methods of poverty measurement associated with household
income surveys. Given the uneven impacts of COVID- on livelihoods, these
gaps highlight a need to go beyond poverty measures currently dominant in the
UK and beyond.
Whilst attempts have recently been made to explore heterogeneity below
the poverty line, ‘urgent research is needed to better understand the experi-
ences and outcomes of people who are measured as being more than %
below the poverty line’ (SMC, : ). With that in mind, this paper seeks
to answer the following questions: How has the profile and depth of poverty
changed in the UK since ? And how are these trends related to the
changing socio-demographic characteristics of ‘the poor’? Drawing on data
from the Family Resources survey, I demonstrate that there has been a
splintering in the economic fortunes of different percentile and socio-
demographic groups falling towards the bottom of the income distribution.
The findings demonstrate the need to deploy a plurality of approaches to
poverty measurement, to better understand how and why people move,
not just ‘in’ and ‘out’ of (extreme) financial hardship, but also through it
along a continuum of disadvantage. The paper concludes by reflecting on
what this means for poverty analysis and alleviation.
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Background and Policy Context
Depending on the particular dimension foregrounded, the concept of relative
poverty can be an imperfect but common proxy for identifying (A) a lack of
financial means for human welfare (B) systemic exclusion from mainstream
social practices; (C) material or resource deprivation whereby individuals lack
access to certain items or activities deemed necessary; or (D) a combination of
all three (Bradshaw and Finch, ). Each of these traditions within poverty
studies is rooted in a conception of disadvantage that seeks to foreground a par-
ticular feature of its character, cause or effect. All nonetheless attempt to capture
the relative nature of poverty and better understand this in relation to the ‘rest of
society’. In doing so though, binary demarcations between those above and
below a given ‘threshold’ (usually % of median incomes) risk glossing
over much of the heterogeneity that exists below the relative poverty line
(Figure ). Such an approach risks ascribing a unilateral condition or experience
to the entirety of the broader category of ‘the poor’ (a sizeable portion of the
income distribution), without recognising how income poverty functions in a
scalar (or even vector) relationship with questions of ‘human welfare’, ‘partici-
pation’ and ‘inclusion’. Indeed, it might be reasonably assumed, but is subject to
empirical investigation, that households furthest from the relative poverty
threshold are not only likely to be experiencing (D) but in a qualitatively differ-
ent sense to those closer to the poverty line.
Since the - global financial crisis, a great deal of attention has been
paid to the changing profile of income inequality with efforts made to explore
gradations of advantage amongst ‘the rich’. However, we have not witnessed the
same efforts to explore degrees of disadvantage. Whilst it is beyond the remit of
this paper to examine the qualitative significance of a changing poverty profile,
I do explore the relativity of financial hardship that bears on the lives of those
living, to varying degrees, below the poverty line. It is hoped doing so affords
fuller insight into the distributional effects of socio-economic and welfare state
restructuring.
Since , reforms to the tax-benefit system have reduced the coverage and
generosity of low-income, working-age social security in the UK. Over the last
decade, Crisis Loans, the Child Trust Fund, Education Maintenance Allowance,
as well as elements of Child Tax Credit andWorking Tax Credit have been abol-
ished. The phased introduction of Universal Credit (UC) is gradually consoli-
dating six working-age benefits into a single payment to ‘incentivise’ work and
streamline the claims-making process. Much less generous than its original for-
mulation, those towards the bottom (%) of the income distribution have lost
most (Brewer et al., ). Delayed payments and sanctioning have also pre-
sented significant risks to the economic security of low-income households.
Between -, uprating for certain benefits (including elements of Tax
Credits (TC) and Child Benefit) moved from the Retail Price Index to
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Consumer Price Index. In , the majority of working-age benefits were fro-
zen for four years, along with tax credits and local housing allowances. Local
rent limits and under-occupancy penalties have been introduced for certain
groups in social housing. A benefit cap has been introduced (and subsequently
lowered) with the national main rate currently set at £, (£, in
London). In , a two-child limit was introduced which means UC will only
provide support for a maximum of two children for certain families. The full
impact of this is yet to be felt with the effects being cumulative for larger families.
Breaking the link between entitlement and need, the result of these changes is a
substantive decline in ‘the adequacy of income support’ for many low-income
households with benefit levels falling further away from average earnings and
minimum income standards since  (Hirsch, : ).
Particularly for larger low-income families, these changes are ‘guaranteed to
increase poverty depth’ (Bradshaw and Keung, : ; Lee, ). The distri-
butional effects of this are, in many respects, well-rehearsed. Academic and grey
literature demonstrates the highly regressive nature of welfare recalibration
whereby changes have damaged the living standards of those toward the bottom
of the income distribution most. For example, distributional analysis demon-
strates that those in the st and nd deciles of the income distribution are likely to
lose around % of their incomes as a result of tax and benefit changes
(Resolution Foundation, : ). Many have also highlighted how these cuts
are heavily gendered and racialised in ways that are routinely glossed over
(Bassel and Emejulu, ; Hall et al., ).
Since , many have forecast that ‘the likely outcome is an increase in
poverty and inequalities in the next few years’ (Taylor-Gooby, : ).
And yet, rates of relative poverty for the whole population have flatlined (with
Figure . Conceptualising relative poverty: categorical vs. continuum
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isolated upticks for smaller population subgroups) (DWP, a). There are a
number of reasons for this that do not exclusively concern the working-age pop-
ulation or indeed the economic resources available to low-income households
(Bourquin et al., ). However, one possibility is that those worst affected
by welfare reforms may already have been below the poverty line before tax-
benefit changes took effect. This is all the more likely given that those dispro-
portionately exposed to the negative effects of social security cuts (very
low-income households, working-age adults and children) are most prone to
‘persistent poverty’ (SMC, ). Looking ahead, there is evidence to
suggest that those furthest away from the poverty line are worst affected by
COVID- in terms of employment and pay (SMC, ). Crisis social security
measures have helped temper some of the worst effects for the ‘poorest families’
through uprating, easements and additions. However, many of these changes are
temporary, partial or ineffectual for households claiming legacy benefits or
affected by the benefit cap and two child-limit. If the uprating to UC and
TC standard allowance is not made permanent, the poorest households stand
to lose % of their annual income on average in  (Handscomb, ).
Against this backdrop, threshold approaches to poverty analysis that focus
exclusively on rates as opposed to degrees of financial hardship will (continue to)
fail to fully capture the changing living standards of low-income households in
the years to come. Situating more recent developments within their historical
context, this limitation is clearest looking at rates of ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ pov-
erty over time. In /, % of individuals were living on less than % of
contemporary median household incomes (after housing costs) (DWP, a).
Following a widespread expansion in means-tested benefits for low-income
families in the early years of New Labour, this fell to % in /.
However, it has not really moved since and currently stands at % according
to the latest available figures (DWP, a). As we might expect, rates of
‘absolute’ poverty fell considerably between the mid s and mid s: from
% of individuals living on less than % of / median household
incomes (held constant in real terms) in /, to % in / suggesting
an improvement in the living standards of low-income individuals. Since then
however, rates of progress have been limited and stood at % in /
(DWP, a).
In the UK and further afield, reforms have either been introduced or pro-
posed to develop alternative indicators of poverty within official statistics to
more effectively capture realities, causes and effects believed to shape low-
income dynamics (Francis-Devine, ). In part, this is motivated by a
long-standing concern about the validity of dominant methods of measurement
and, in particular, their capacity to capture extreme poverty (Bradshaw and
Movshuk, ). In response, there are a range of approaches seeking to better
understand the intensity of poverty. The most obvious approach is to use a lower
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poverty threshold but this ultimately suffers from the same methodological lim-
itations as a higher threshold measure. Alternatives include the World Bank $x
per day indicator, severe deprivation indices and thresholds set relative to social
assistance, minimum income standards or reference budgets. Each of these
measures have distinctive benefits and limitations but have all been used to mea-
sure aspects of extreme poverty across time and space (Bradshaw and Movshuk,
, Lister ). The most widely used indicator of poverty intensity across
advanced capitalist economies is currently the ‘poverty gap’ indicator which
measures how far people fall, on average, from the poverty line. Bradshaw
and Keung () evidence increases in the absolute and relative poverty gap
for households with children in the UK since  and argue cuts to social secu-
rity entitlement have undermined the minimum income scheme previously
available. More recently, poverty depth has also been assessed through the
‘low income gap’ which measures the average distance people fall from a socially
agreed minimum income standard (Hirsch et al., ). Whilst instructive, these
approaches tend to track aggregate trends which, as demonstrated later in this
paper, presents particular difficulties if bifurcation in the living standards of
low-income households is observed.
Finally, an increasingly popular approach is to combine multiple indicators.
For example, the Europe  ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ indicator is
a composite measure of income poverty, severe material deprivation of items
and activities, and work intensity, that seeks to capture the multidimensional
character, causes and effects of disadvantage. Composite indicators such as this
are most effective as capturing multiple dimensions and degrees of poverty at the
same time. However, this paper focuses exclusively on income indicators to
assess changing living standards. I do so mindful of the limitations associated
with such an approach (discussed later in this paper). I am nonetheless keen
to focus on the proxies of disadvantage currently used in official poverty statis-
tics that are perhaps less contested and have greatest (apolitical) currency across
research, policy and practice. Policies such as the UKWelfare Reform andWork
Act that sought to move away from income-based measures have been widely
criticised for conflating definitions of poverty with some of the causes and cor-
relates of it (e.g. Stewart and Roberts, ). Such developments nonetheless
reflect growing political and policy concern that anti-poverty interventions
are failing to identify and target ‘hard-to-reach’ groups, most in need of public
assistance. As a result, there has been a broader movement to better understand
and target ‘vulnerable’ low-income households – especially workless families
with children – through improvements to data collection, analysis and policy
intervention (DWP, ). Lessons from (and shortcomings in) these initiatives
have fuelled applied and theoretical interest in the dominant methods of poverty
measurement that tend to frame and delimit the social scientific analysis of
poverty.
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Data and Methodology
This paper presents analysis based on data from the Family Resources Survey
(FRS) which is used to produce national statistics on poverty and inequality
in the UK (DWP, b). This survey offers a uniquely rich dataset on levels
and sources of income, as well as household and socio-demographic character-
istics. The FRS has been conducted continuously since , with a large rep-
resentative sample of around , households for each year. I draw on the
Households Below Average Income (HBAI) dataset which includes derived var-
iables drawing on underlying data from the FRS (DWP, c). All findings
concerning ‘income’ refer to weekly net disposable income after housing costs:
as a better approximation of living standards. Nominal values are presented in
/ prices. Unless otherwise stated, the unit of analysis is based on individ-
ual level data. However, incomes are measured at the household level and
equivalised using the OECD modified equivalence scale (cf. Karagiannaki
and Burchardt, ).
Bivariate analysis is undertaken to establish the changing economic security
and characteristics of individuals in the bottom th, th, th, th percentiles
of the income distribution between / and / (the latest available
year). These percentiles are not used as alternative ‘thresholds’ or ‘definitions’
of poverty, but as instructive indicators to establish varying degrees of privation
in two ways. First, to explore real terms nominal and relative changes in the
living standards of individuals falling within and between different interval (per-
centile) groups over time. Second, to examine how socio-demographic charac-
teristics are related to changes in the resources and position of different groups
across the low-income distribution. The results outline trends in the living
standards of different interval groups, and the changing depth of poverty for
social groups most exposed to it.
The term ‘deep poverty’ is used here to refer to those falling in the bottom
% of the income distribution. Such categorisation is obviously subject to the
same limitations as any other cut-off point but is used here as part of a broader
strategy to explore compositional changes within and across low-income inter-
val groups. Whilst the term deep poverty is often inconsistently applied, it is
anticipated that individuals falling within this group are not only likely to be
experiencing (D), but in a qualitatively different sense to those closer towards
the relative poverty threshold (Figure ). This is of course subject to empirical
investigation, but if true stands to nuance a categorical understanding of relative
poverty that is currently widespread. There are also a number of methodological
motivations for focusing on the bottom % that concern the accurate measure-
ment of living standards towards the very bottom of the income distribution.
Previous research suggests household survey data on the very bottom (-%)
of the income distribution are susceptible to biases in non-response, sample
attrition and benefit under-reporting (Bramley et al., ; Brewer et al.,
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; Corlett et al., ). For example, inadequate correspondence between
incomes and expenditure and numerous risks associated with measurement
error (Meyer et al., ). For this reason, the inclusion of the lowest-income
cases in FRS analyses has previously been brought into question (Bramley
et al., : ). That said, the FRS does offer the best available data: growth
in ‘benefit and tax credit incomes are similar in administrative and FRS data
over time’ (Bourquin et al., : ). In addition, Brewer et al. () find that
incomes and expenditure monotonically increase from the nd percentile of the
income distribution and begin to better reflect actual living standards. With this
in mind, a conservative approach has been taken to exclude the bottom % of
cases when measuring nominal and relative income changes for the bottom %
of the income distribution unless otherwise stated. This follows the convention
of the Department for Work and Pensions and makes it possible to measure
outcomes of those that are a significant distance from the poverty line, without
compromising on data quality and thus inferences possible (DWP, a).
The analysis is divided into three parts. First, I present descriptive statistics
on the changing incomes of different interval groups towards the bottom of the
income distribution. Second, I present bivariate analysis on differences in the
socio-demographic characteristics of those falling in different interval groups.
Third, results from multiple logistic regression are discussed to compare the risk
of falling into deep poverty across different socio-demographic groups over
time. Model  includes time period only for the two years under consideration:
/ and /. In Model , I add socio-demographic predictor variables
in a stepwise fashion to assess the extent to which period differences could be the
result of an altered composition of the overall population. In Models -,
I explore interaction terms with period to establish whether the socio-
demographic composition and labour market engagement of those falling into
deep poverty has changed since /. To enhance interpretability and to pro-
vide a more parsimonious model, sociodemographic predictor variables such as
age, ethnicity and labour market engagement have been collapsed from more
detailed categorisations so that there are fewer parameters to model interaction
effects. BAME data in the bivariate analysis are based on three-year averages
(/-/) because single year estimates are considered too volatile
for smaller ethnic minority groups (DWP, c). However, logistic regressions
only draw from single-year estimates as the models are based on larger ethnic
minority categories for the two years under consideration. To address the prob-
lem of unobserved heterogeneity in logistic regression, y-standardisation of the
logit coefficient (B) has been undertaken in Appendix  (Mood, ). Here,
odds ratios (Exp(B)) have been rescaled to make them more comparable within
and across nested models. In light of ongoing debate about whether such rescal-
ing is necessary (Kuha and Mills, ), unstandardized summary results are
also available in Table . All findings draw on analyses of weighted estimates.
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Results
How has the profile and depth of poverty changed since 2010?
The equivalised poverty line (after housing costs) increased from £ to
£ between / and /. However, the very poorest have seen their
average incomes fall further away from this line since . For individuals in
the bottom % and % of the income distribution, the nominal gap between
median incomes and the poverty line has grown by % and % respectively
(Figure ). For those closest to the poverty line (in the nd and rd decile of the
income distribution) their incomes have kept better pace with real terms
increases in the poverty threshold. As a ratio, this means that the average
(median) value of incomes for the bottom % has fallen from % to % of
the poverty line between / and / and from % to % for those
in the bottom % over the same period (Figure ). By contrast, the income
ratios for those in the nd and rd decile have remained relatively stable. The
result is a nominal and relative reduction in the resources available to those
towards the very bottom, with those closer to the poverty line seeing their
incomes remain reasonably stable in comparison.
Situating these trends within a broader context, Figure  summarises the
percentage change in average incomes of different interval groups and demon-
strates varied fluctuation in low-income living standards over time. Since /
, those towards the bottom (% and %) of the income distribution have
experienced a substantive reduction in average incomes, whilst those closer
to the poverty line (nd and rd deciles) have experienced modest increases.
However, these trends are particularly pronounced from  onwards. In part,
this is explained by a staged divergence in the economic fortunes of different
income interval groups in the wake of the / global financial crisis.
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Figure . Nominal gap between median income of interval groups and the relative poverty line
(AHC, £pw equivalised / prices)
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recovered whilst average incomes for those closer to the poverty line stagnated
but then began to catch up with median incomes in earnest. As a result, a more
dramatic bifurcation in the living standards of low-income individuals is observ-
able from . Between / and /, those in the bottom % and %
of the income distribution witnessed a reduction in their average incomes by
% and %, whilst average incomes for those in the nd and rd deciles increased
by % and % respectively. These trends co-incide with a series of changes to the
tax-benefit system (implemented from  onwards) that many have previ-
ously argued regressively impact on the livelihoods of low-income households
(e.g. Resolution Foundation, : ). However, the trends presented here
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Figure . Percentage change between median incomes of interval groups, /-/
(AHC, £pw equivalised / prices)
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demonstrate that the very poorest are losing most with other low-income
individuals experiencing relative increases that come closer to keeping pace
with median incomes. Alongside differential labour market engagement
trends, those in the nd and rd decile have been less exposed (at least in rel-
ative terms) to social security changes implemented since , compared to
those in the bottom % of the income distribution (Bourquin et al., ;
Gardiner, ).
Between / and /, equivalised median incomes for the overall
population grew from £ to £. At the same time, average (mean) dispos-
able incomes fell considerably for the lowest income groups (Table ). This
means that those in the bottom % of the income distribution saw their annual
incomes fall by £ on average between / and /. By contrast,
those in the nd and rd deciles saw their annual incomes increase by £
and £ on average respectively during the same period.
A consequence of these trends is that an increasing proportion of low-
income households are falling further away from the poverty line. Returning
to a broader view, the proportion of households falling more than % below
the poverty line grew from .% to .% between / and /
(Table ). Over the same period, the proportion of households falling more than
% below the poverty line increased from .% to .%. Since , the pro-
portion of low-income households falling more than % below the poverty line
has grown by an estimated . percentage points.
In sum, there has been a splintering in the economic fortunes of different
interval groups falling towards the bottom of the income distribution. Thus far,
these trends have not been fully captured because current attempts to measure
poverty depth rely on average incomes for all those falling below a given thresh-
old to compare this against nominal or ratio trends. Measures that focus exclu-
sively on these aggregate changes inevitably gloss over dispersion within the
broad category of ‘the poor’. Often used as a measure of poverty depth, the ‘pov-
erty gap’ is one such indicator that risks underestimating the full extent to which
there has been a deepening of poverty because it does not account for potential
bifurcation in the economic resources available to low-income households at
different interval groups. Whilst this may result in an underestimation of cur-
rent trends, other approaches seeking to capture poverty depth that fail to
account for this may actually lead to a misrepresentation of current trends.
For example, in  the UK Social Metrics Commission, a key proponent
of alternative and additional poverty measures, argued that the depth of poverty
had changed very little since  (SMC, ). An official briefing from the
House of Commons library, reporting on poverty depths concluded that ‘on
average, people living below the poverty line have moved closer towards it’
(Francis-Devine, : ). Such conclusions underline the need to a) better
measure and report on heterogeneity ‘below the line’ in poverty analysis, and
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TABLE . Mean and Standard Deviation of Equivalised Disposable Income by Interval Groups (AHC, £pw equivalised / prices)
/ Mean / SD / Mean / SD Mean Difference (Xi - X j) Effect Size Cohen’s d
Annual change in
incomes
.%-% . . . . . . £
.%-% . . . . . . £
.%-%∗ . . . . −. . £-
.%-%∗ . . . . −. . £-
∗ The bottom % of the income distribution are excluded due to data volatility.
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b) refine existing poverty depth indicators to capture low-income dynamics
over time.
How has the socio-demographic profile of (deep) poverty changed
since 2010?
The systematic over-representation of particular social groups in poverty is
well-documented. However, examination of this phenomenon has often treated
poverty as a categorical condition which particular social groups are more or less
likely to fall into. Such an approach to both material and social axes of division
can be productive for establishing how certain groups fare relative to others, and
the wider standards prevailing. However, as observed in the previous section,
economic disadvantage is neither unilateral nor linear, and methods that treat
it as such risk obscuring or misrepresenting trends. This does not render a sys-
temic examination of the relationship between poverty and social difference
impossible. However, it does require a more fine-grained conceptualisation of
financial hardship: one that avoids relying on or reproducing a binary under-
standing of disadvantage. With this in mind, I now explore how degrees of
poverty intersect with markers of social difference across the entirety of the
low-income distribution, not just on either side of a given threshold.
In Tables  and , I present an overview of how the socio-demographic
composition of (deep) poverty has changed since . These tables detail
the proportion of particular social groups represented in the whole population,
in relative poverty, and in the bottom three deciles of the income distribution in
/ and /. Through simple cross-tabulations, I explore nominal and
ratio changes in the incidence of (varying degrees of) poverty accounting for
broader demographic and labour market trends. Results summarised in
Tables  and  confirm that the incidence of relative poverty is much higher
amongst children, women, BAME groups, those affected by a disability, and
those that are unemployed, working part-time and living in households with
 or more dependent children. However, bivariate analysis also reveals signifi-
cant non-linear variation in the exposure of particular social groups to grada-
tions of financial hardship since . In Table , I present a summary of binary
logistic regression analyses undertaken to compare the influence of socio-
demographics on the likelihood of being in deep poverty over time. All of
the socio-demographic and economic variables included had a statistically sig-
nificant effect on the likelihood of being in deep poverty. However, only a selec-
tion of observations are discussed here for the sake of interpretability: I examine
trends for women, children, those affected by a disability, ‘race’ and ethnicity,
and economic status in turn.
Since , there has been an increase (.%) in the proportion of women in
relative poverty and a slight growth (.%) in the proportion in deep poverty,
but women are still relatively ‘under-represented’ in this group, compared to
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TABLE . Socio-demographic change by low-income interval groups
.%-% .%-% .%-% (% of) Total Population % in Poverty
Total number of people
/ ,, ,, ,, ,, .%
/ ,, ,, ,, ,, .%
Total number of households
/ ,, ,, ,, ,, .%
/ ,, ,, ,, ,, .%
Women (as % of interval group in parentheses)
/ (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, .%
/ (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, .%
% Group .% −.% .% − .%
% Interval .% −.% .% −.% −
Children (as % of interval group in parentheses)
/ (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, .%
/ (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, .%
% Group .% .% −.% − .%
% Interval .% .% −.% −.% −
Households with  children (as % of interval group in parentheses)
/ (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , ,, .%
/ (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , ,, .%
% Group .% .% .% − .%
% Interval .% .% .% .% −
Households with  children (as % of interval group in parentheses)
/ (%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
/ (%) , (.%) , (%) , (.%) ,, .%
% Group .% .% −.% − .%
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TABLE . Continued
.%-% .%-% .%-% (% of) Total Population % in Poverty
Affected by a disability (as % of interval group in parentheses)
/ (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, .%
/ (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, .%
% Group .% .% −.% − .%
% Interval .% .% .% .% −
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic people (BAME)∗ (as % of interval group in parentheses)
- (%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
- (.%) ,, (%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, .%
% Group −.% .% .% − −.%
% Interval .% .% .% .% −
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TABLE . Socio-demographic change by low-income interval groups
.%-% .%-% .%-% (% of) Total Population % in Poverty
Pakistani∗ (as % of interval group in parentheses)
- (%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
- (%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
% Group −.% −.% .% − −.%
% Interval −.% .% .% .% −
Bangladeshi∗ (as % of interval group in parentheses)
- (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , .%
- (.%) , (%) , (.%) , (.%) , .%
% Group −.% .% −.% − −.%
% Interval −.% .% .% .% −
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British∗ (as % of interval group in parentheses)
- (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
- (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
% Group .% .% −.% − .%
% Interval .% .% .% .% −
Self-employed∗∗ (as % of interval group in parentheses)
/ (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
/ (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
% Group −.% .% .% − .%
% Interval −.% .% .% .% −
Working part-time∗∗ (as % of interval group in parentheses)
/ (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
/ (.%) , (.%) ,, (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
% Group .% .% −.% − .%
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TABLE . Continued
.%-% .%-% .%-% (% of) Total Population % in Poverty
Full-time work∗∗ (% of interval group in parentheses)
/ (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
/ (.%) , (.%) , (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
% Group .% −.% .% − .%
% Interval .% .% .% .% −
Workless∗∗ (as % of interval group in parentheses)
/ (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) ,, .%
/ (.%) ,, (.%) ,, (.%) , (.%) ,, .%
% Group −.% −.% −.% − −.%
% Interval −.% −.% −.% −.% −
∗ Figures are based on -year averages. ∗∗ Economic status of benefit unit (ECOBU); “Self-employed” = One or more self-employed “Part-time” = No one in full-
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other low-income interval groups and the rest of the population (Table ).
Variation in the gendered composition of low-income interval groups highlights
the importance of complicating a standard feminisation of poverty thesis
(Dermott and Pantazis, ). Specifically, there is a need for a gendered analy-
sis of poverty that does not assume women’s exposure to the risk of financial
hardship functions in a unilinear fashion. Such an approach reveals that the
increase in rates of relative poverty amongst women since , is principally
driven by an increasing proportion of women in deep poverty. In line with
the bivariate results, Model  presented in Table , shows that the likelihood
of being in deep poverty (as opposed to not being in deep poverty) is slightly
lower for women than men (reference category) (odds ratio [OR]=.) but
this gender gap is smaller in / (OR=.) than it was in / (ref-
erence category). This is, perhaps, unsurprising given that low-income (partic-
ularly BAME) women have been some of those worst affected by changes to the
tax-benefit system since  (Hall et al., ).
Between  and , the proportion of children in relative poverty
increased from .% to .%. During the same period, the proportion of chil-
dren in deep poverty increased by .%. As a result, more than a quarter
(.%) of those in deep poverty are currently children (Table ). The increased
incidence of relative and deep poverty amongst children is particularly pro-
nounced for children in larger families who are more likely to be affected by
the two-child limit and benefit cap. Since , the proportion of larger families
in deep poverty has increased significantly: by .% for households with 
children, and by .% for households with  children (Table ). These results
demonstrate an increasing risk and depth of poverty witnessed amongst children in
the UK. Compared to pensioners (reference category), all other age groups are more
likely to be in deep poverty (OR3564=.; OR1634=.; OR019=.).
However, the likelihood of falling into deep poverty has increased most for children
since  (OR=.) (Model , Table ). Depending on the number of depen-
dent children in it, households differ in terms of their likelihood of being in deep
poverty (OR1 child=.,OR2 depchild=.,OR3depchild=.) (Model , Table ).
Since , the likelihood of being in deep poverty for households with one depen-
dent child has decreased (OR1 child=.), and the lower likelihood of being in deep
poverty for larger families has weakened, particularly for those with  dependent
children (OR2 depchild=., OR3depchild=.) (Model , Table ). Despite addi-
tional COVID- provisions and temporary uprating, these trends are likely to
continue with the benefit cap and two-child limit still in place.
Between -, the proportion of households affected by a disability
living in relative poverty increased from .% to .% (Table ). Looking
at low-income interval groups, there has also been a slight increase (.%) in
the depth of poverty amongst those affected by a disability (Table ). The likeli-
hood of falling into deep poverty is lower for those affected by a disability
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TABLE . Summary results of logistic regression for likelihood of being in deep poverty, / and /, Odds Ratios and
(Standard Errors)
Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model 
Constant . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Period (Ref. /) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Sex (Ref. Male) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Age (Ref. Pensionable)
Older working-age (-) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Younger working-age (-) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Children (-) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Ethnicity (Ref. White)
A Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Group . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
B Asian/Asian British . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
C Black/African/Caribbean/British . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
D Other Ethnic Group . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Disability (Ref. family not affected) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Dependent Children (Ref. none)
 Dependent Child in Household . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
 Dependent Children . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
 Dependent Children . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
Employment Status (Ref. Full-time)
A One or more self-employed . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
B Full-time and part-time work . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
C Only part-time work . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.) . (.)
D Workless (Inactive/
Unemployed)
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TABLE . Continued
Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model 
Interaction Terms Sex Age Ethnicity Disability Children Employment
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(OR=.) and this is slightly more pronounced in / than it was in
/ (OR=.) (Model , Table ). However, the extent of poverty depth
for those affected by a disability is likely to be underestimated given that addi-
tional disability-related costs are not reflected in calculations of disposable
household income in the FRS (SMC, ). Since , a shrinking category
of disability in social security administration has reduced the coverage and gen-
erosity of benefits. In part, we can see this reflected in the disproportionate
growth (.%) of those affected by a disability represented in the nd decile
of the income distribution (Table ).
Rates of relative poverty amongst BAME individuals remain particularly
high: .% in  reducing to .% in  (Table ). Alongside this, there
have been compositional changes in the ethnic profile of the low-income popu-
lation that are not in line with those observed in the wider general population.
There has been an increase in the representation of BAME individuals in the
bottom  deciles of the income distribution, but relative increases are particu-
larly pronounced closest to the poverty line in the nd and rd deciles (.%
and %). Despite only making up .% of the overall population, almost a
quarter (.%) of those in deep poverty were BAME in  (Table ). Model  in
Table  shows that the likelihood of being in deep poverty is significantly lower for
White groups (reference category) than it is for Mixed (OR=.), Asian
(OR=.), Black (OR=.) and Other Ethnic (OR=.) groups.
However, interaction terms show that such racial and ethnical inequalities
became less pronounced for those identifying as Mixed (OR= .), Asian
(OR= .) or Other Ethnic group (OR= .) between  and 
(Model , Table ). A particularly pronounced periodic effect witnessed amongst
Asian individuals is also reflected in descriptive trends. In Table , rates of rela-
tive poverty are shown to have fallen amongst Pakistani and Bangladeshi indi-
viduals (albeit from a very high place) since . Accounting for changes in the
ethnic composition of the overall population, there has been a substantial
reduction in the proportion of Pakistani and Bangladeshi individuals in deep
poverty: falling by .% and .% respectively. The extent of this improve-
ment differs across the low-income distribution though with the representa-
tion of Pakistani individuals increasing (.%) closer to the poverty line
(in the rd income decile) and representation of Bangladeshi individuals
increasing considerably (.%) in the nd income decile. Compared
to all other ethnic groups, Black individuals have fared worst in terms of their
economic security since . Beyond an increased rate of relative poverty
(from .% to .%), the proportion in deep poverty has grown consider-
ably by .% (Table ). As a result, over a fifth (.%) of all Black people
are currently in deep poverty. Model  in Table  confirms that the likelihood
of being in deep poverty for Black people is stronger (OR=.) in 
than it was in .
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For employment status, the results from Model  in Table  demonstrate
there are significant differences in the likelihood of being in deep poverty
depending on the type and degree of labour market engagement. Those living
in households comprising full-time work (reference category) are much less
likely to be in deep poverty than those whose household economic status is
self-employed (OR=.), a mixture of full-time and part-time employment
(OR=.), only part-time work (OR=.), or workless (OR=.).
That said, full-time work appears to have become less effective at protecting
against deep poverty. Since , the likelihood of being in deep poverty
has fallen for other types of employment compared to those in full-time work
(e.g. ORselfemployed=., ORworkless=.).
In part, this is explained by an intrinsic increase in working poverty in the
UK whereby the poorest have seen the biggest increase in employment rates in
recent years. For example, rates of relative poverty amongst those living in full-
time working households grew slightly from .% to .% between  and
 (Table ). During the same period, the proportion of people living in
full-time working households in deep poverty jumped considerably by .%
(Table ). In addition to this, there has been a substantial reduction (-.%)
in the representation of workless households in deep poverty between 
and  (Table ). However, the most substantial reduction has been the repre-
sentation of workless households that fall in the nd and rd deciles of the income
distribution: -.% and -.% respectively. Since , the risk and depth of
poverty has increased significantly for those living in part-time working house-
holds: a third are currently in relative poverty and the proportion in deep pov-
erty has grown by .% (Table ). Overall, it appears there are not just limits to
which work provides a meaningful route out of poverty (Hick and Lanau, ),
but also a route out of deep poverty.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I have outlined trends in the changing economic security of those
living, to varying degrees, below the poverty line. Since , there has been a
bifurcation in the living standards of low-income citizens in the UK. Those clos-
est to the poverty line have seen relative improvements in their incomes. At the
same time, there has been a deepening and intensification of financial hardship
for those towards the very bottom of the income distribution with the propor-
tion of people falling % below the poverty line growing by .% since 
(Table ). These changes in the economic profile of poverty have also occurred
alongside substantive shifts below the poverty line that are reconfiguring the
socio-demographic composition of (deep) poverty. Despite ostensive progress
in reducing rates of relative poverty amongst particular social groups, markers
of social difference are intersecting with gradations of financial hardship in ways
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that are non-linear but nonetheless systematic. The likelihood of being in deep
poverty has increased for women, children, larger families, Black people, and
those in full-time work since .
In light of the findings, it is worth reflecting on a key limitation of using
household income surveys to measure changes in the depth and (socio-
demographic) composition of poverty. Namely, that the increasing depth and
socio-demographic diversity of poverty is likely to be underestimated. This is
for three reasons. First, Corlett et al. (: ) warn ‘of the UK’s population
of  million, . million are outside the scope of the FRS’ because only those
in private households are sampled. Trends then, suggesting an increasing depth
of poverty, are likely to be underestimated as ‘some groups at high risk of des-
titution may also be over-represented in the categories of non-response, missing
data and sample attrition’ (Bramley et al., : ). Second, the full impact of
tax and benefit changes will not yet be reflected in available FRS data. The four-
year freeze to working-age benefits began in / so the cumulative signifi-
cance of this is only currently observable for three years of available data: we can
therefore reasonably anticipate an increasing depth of poverty in future data
releases. Third, the depth of poverty is likely to be more pronounced once (gen-
dered) intra-household inequalities are taken into account (Karagiannaki and
Burchardt, ).
Despite these limitations, evidence on the changing poverty profile and
socio-demographic composition of those below the poverty line can be brought
to bear on established debates concerning poverty categorisation, measurement
and analysis in four ways. First, to encourage critical reflection on how and what
we should measure when it comes to researching ‘the poor’ and what this means
for dominant analytical and methodological frameworks within poverty studies.
Second, to refine our theoretical understanding of poverty and the extent to
which ‘human welfare’, ‘participation’ and ‘inclusion’ can be understood as
either present or absent in the lives of (extremely) low-income households.
This is particularly important for fleshing out a conception of poverty that
accounts for the relational gradations of ‘agency’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘welfare’ that
mediate the lives of low-income households. Such an approach makes it possible
to establish how and why people move, not just ‘in’ and ‘out’ of financial hard-
ship, but also ‘through’ it along a continuum of disadvantage. This should
encourage poverty researchers to examine what, if anything, is distinctive about
deep poverty and the wider continuum of disadvantage it sits within. A third,
and related, avenue of research is to capitalise on the additional dimensions of
description and social explanation that a non-categorical measure of financial
hardship brings. Doing so makes it possible to identify what underlies a cluster-
ing or dispersion of low incomes and what affects the likelihood of falling into
deep poverty over time through the use of panel data. Fourth, to better
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understand how ‘social difference’ is articulated in relation to the material social
locations of people, across the entirety of the income distribution, not just on
either side of a given threshold. Within the current context, these agendas
for poverty research present an opportunity to better understand, explain
and address the full distributional effects of tax-benefit changes implemented
since  and the COVID- pandemic.
The findings of this paper also raise questions for policy and practice when
it comes to poverty alleviation. In terms of official statistics, the results demon-
strate how dominant methods of poverty measurement are not currently fit for
purpose. That is, they fail to fully capture the (socio-demographic) composition
and depth of poverty which invariably constrains the capacity of social policy to
both understand and tackle it. In particular, it is clear that the ‘poverty gap’ indi-
cator that is often used to analyse poverty depth needs to be used alongside
measures such as those presented in this paper to account for and track potential
bifurcation in the living standards of low-income households below the poverty
line. It is also clear that a pluralistic approach to poverty measurement is needed:
one that recognises the distinctive merits and limitations of particular indicators
of financial hardship. To gain the fullest picture of changes in the profile and
depth of poverty, a range of measures need to be used in tandem to capture
nominal and relative dimensions across the entirety of the low-income distribu-
tion. In an era of constrained public social spending, this matters for identifying
which tax-benefit changes can most effectively and efficiently mitigate against
(deep) poverty. This presents a number of challenges for how policy evaluation
and design (e.g. equality impact assessments and targeted means-testing) might
respond to varying degrees and dimensions of financial hardship whilst imple-
menting poverty alleviation measures that are practicably feasible. In the wake of
COVID-, this will become increasingly important given that the very poorest
individuals are likely to be worst affected by the pandemic (SMC, ) and
certain key groups (such as those with No Recourse to Public Funds) have been
overlooked by government protections and provisions.
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Notes
 Similarly, poverty (alleviation) policy routinely frames our particular understanding of
financial hardship and its underlying determinants.
 As argued by Summers (: ), there are methodological and ethical risks in not delin-
eating between individual research subjects and ‘the wider social groups(s) to which they are
understood to belong’ (and indeed further challenges in understanding what it means to
‘belong to’ a given social group).
 Some of these trends have been partially offset by real terms increases in the minimum wage
and labour market participation.
 As discussed in the methodology, reported incomes for the bottom % exclude cases for the
bottom % and this applies to Figures -.
 To speculate on the drivers behind this trend, the employment rate for Pakistani and
Bangladeshi individuals grew by .% compared to by .% for the overall population
between - lifting many out of deep poverty but not low incomes (GOV.UK, ).
 There are also a number of exogenous reasons for this (cf. Bourquin et al., ).
 A notable exception to this, is the reduction in relative and deep poverty experienced by
BAME groups overall and Pakistani and Bangladeshi people in particular.
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